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Lay Jurors in Patent Litigation: Reviving the Active, 
Inquisitorial Model for Juror Participation* 
Joel C. Johnson** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  When the peremptory challenges were all exhausted, a jury of 
twelve men was impaneled—a jury who swore they had neither heard, 
read, talked about nor expressed an opinion concerning a murder 
which the very cattle in the corrals, the Indians in the sage-brush and 
the stones in the streets were cognizant of!  It was a jury composed of 
two desperados, two low beer-house politicians, three bar-keepers, two 
ranchmen who could not read, and three dull, stupid, human donkeys!  
It actually came out afterward, that one of these latter thought that 
incest and arson were the same thing. 
. . . 
  The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a 
premium upon ignorance, stupidity and perjury.  It is a shame that we 
must continue to use a worthless system because it was good a 
thousand years ago.1 
 
In recent decades jurors have increasingly been called to 
the task of adjudicating patent infringement claims.2  Indeed, 
while in 1940 only 2.5% of all patent claims were tried before a 
jury, by 1999 that number had swollen to 62%, with most of the 
increase occurring in the past 30 years.3  The bourgeoning jury 
trial docket coupled with the fact that the technologies at issue 
in patent disputes are growing increasingly complex has led 
 
* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
** J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2002, 
Gustavus Adolphus College.  For my mother and father, who pushed me to 
work my hardest and inspired me to always do my best. 
 1. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT, 342-43 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1872) 
(original emphasis omitted). 
 2. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—
an Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 11 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 209 (2002); 
Deborah M. Altman, Defining the Role Of The Jury In Patent Litigation: The 
Court Takes Inventory, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 699 (1997). 
 3. Moore, supra note 2, at 210 n.7.  Moore remarked that most of the 
increase has occurred in the past thirty years.  Id. at 210 nn.6-7 (noting that 
in 1969 only 2.1% of patent cases were tried to juries, compared with 62% in 
1999). 
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academics and legal practitioners to question the efficacy of 
using lay juries to decide patent matters.4  Bolstering the 
arguments of those advocating reform, jury verdicts in patent 
trials are “often unpredictable and inconsistent.”5  This state of 
affairs has led scholars and practitioners alike to call for 
reforms.6  Suggestions range from the relatively small step of 
allowing jurors in patent cases to take notes and use them 
during deliberations7 to disallowing the use of the jury 
entirely.8  The ensuing debate over the role of the jury has 
pitted due process concerns against that great palladium—the 
civil jury.  The issue has forced jurists to reconsider the efficacy 
of the civil jury trial process.  Captured in the midst of this 
debate are the federal courts, which have been called upon to 
define “the proper role of the jury in [patent] cases.”9 
Section II.A of this Note traces the historical development 
of the civil jury trial.  Section II.B investigates the historical 
development of the jury in the patent litigation context 
specifically.  Section II.C addresses some of the problems facing 
the civil jury in patent litigation and the solutions presented 
thus far.  Part III of this Note provides an analysis of proposed 
solutions addressing the use of juries in patent cases.  Finally, 
this Note concludes that rather than change the composition of 
the jury itself, or rid the American system of that hallowed 
institution, the process by which the jury obtains, digests, and 
recalls information should be modified.  That is the manner in 
which the patent jury should be reformed.  This Note argues 
that the central focus of all jury reforms should be to make 
jurors better finders-of-fact in patent disputes.  Thus, the 
 
 4. Id. at 210.  See also Michael A. Fisher, The Legality of Expert Juries in 
Patent Litigation, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Davin M. 
Stockwell, A Jury of One’s (Technically Competent) Peers?, 21 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 645 (2000). 
 5. Altman, supra note 2, at 699. 
 6. See e.g., Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 614 (1984) (arguing 
that in cases of such complexity that they “undoubtedly” fall “well beyond the 
framers’ understanding of ‘Suits at common law,’ no party should have a right 
to demand a jury trial”); see generally Fisher, supra note 4, at 80-81 (calling for 
the use of “Blue Ribbon Juries,” which would consist of “jurors educated in the 
relevant science and technology” at issue). 
 7. Development in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 
1509 (1997). 
 8. See King, supra note 6, at 614; see generally Fisher, supra note 4 
(discussing blue ribbon juries). 
 9. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 645. 
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transformations should be aimed at tearing down the 
communicative barriers hindering the information-gathering 
responsibility of the jury. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
“There was initiated in the twelfth century the most radical 
change that has ever occurred in the legal systems of the 
Western World.”10 
A. THE PALLADIUM OF A FREE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL JURY TRIAL 
The Norman Conquest of 106611 is generally credited with 
making the common law possible.12  To better understand the 
debate surrounding the use of the jury in patent litigation it is 
valuable to know something of its genesis.  Such knowledge is 
exceedingly useful as it provides a framework for 
understanding the problems afflicting the jury and those 
solutions leveled at it.  Additionally, by understanding the 
history of the jury and the historical context in which the 
institution arose, reformers will be better equipped to battle the 
contemporaneous challenges faced by juries and the jury trial.13 
The first petit juries14 exhibited only a few characteristics 
 
 10. Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the 
Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 45 (1980). 
 11. 1 SIR FREDRICK POLLACK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 79 (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1898) (Referring 
to the Norman invasion of the isle in that year and remarking that it was “a 
catastrophe which determin[ed] the whole future history of English law”). 
 12. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 6 
(Butterworths 1971).  BAKER noted that the key to the development of the 
common law was the centralization of the justice system.  Thus, while “[t]he 
main developments of the common law have been attributed . . . to Henry II 
(1154-1189) . . . the Normans set in motion the forces which within two 
centuries gave England a national system of law.”  Id. 
 13. The solutions that can be developed by such a methodology would not 
be new, of course, but would result in changes—in some cases drastic—to the 
contemporary jury.  This historical-contextual approach is beneficial for 
several reasons the most important being the reliance of the Supreme Court 
on history to develop and shape the role of the modern jury through 
constitutional mandates and limitations.  See infra note 29 and accompanying 
text. 
 14. The petit jury must be contrasted with the grand, or inquest, jury, 
which had an earlier origin.  In fact, the Assize of Clarendon institutionalized 
the inquest jury as early as 1166.  See Assize of Clarendon (1166), reprinted in 
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES16 (Ernest F. Henderson trans., 
ed., George Bell and Sons, 1910).  The petit jury followed soon thereafter and 
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manifest in contemporary American civil juries.15  In fact, the 
first jurators existed only to share in the oath of denial with the 
accused.16  As the oath and other forms of trial waned in 
popularity, new characteristics emerged that made the jury a 
particularly effective adjudicator.17  Jurors of the 13th and 14th 
Centuries were selected from pools of individuals who were 
thought to know—or were in a position to learn about—the 
facts of the case.18  Indeed, jurors were expected to be active 
players in the trial process.19  Not only could individual jurors 
question witnesses, but they could use information obtained 
privately from outside the courtroom in forming their 
decision.20  The early jury was extraordinarily active in the 
 
found itself enshrined as a right in 1215 by the hand of King John through the 
Magna Carta.  But see LORD CROSS OF CHELSEA & G. J. HAND, THE ENGLISH 
LEGAL SYSTEM 50 (5th ed., Butterworths 1971) (asserting that the right to a 
jury as described in the Magna Carta is significantly different than the right 
which exists in the modern era). 
 15. Compare HENRY CHARLES LEA, THE DUEL AND THE OATH (Edward 
Peters, ed., 1974) with Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional 
Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 391-414, 421-39 (1996). 
 16. LEA, supra note 15, at 33-34.  Jurators, also known as compurgators, 
were not finders of fact.  Instead, jurators swore a purgatorial oath.  Thus, the 
process had nothing to do with truth and instead focused on one’s reputation.  
Obtaining jurators was not as simple as it sounds because taking a false oath 
was a serious offense.  The penalty for doing so ranged from heavy fines to 
“the customary penalty [for] perjury” of losing a hand.  Id. at 64.  See also 
Devlin, supra note 10, at 46. 
 17. See LORD CROSS & HAND, supra note 14, at 90 (noting that the 
“mediæval jury . . . was expressly selected from among people who might be 
supposed to know or to be in a position to ascertain the facts—from neighbours 
of the parties to the action—and they were expected to answer the questions 
put to them without the assistance of witnesses”). 
 18. Id., but cf. Bernard William McLane, Juror Attitudes Toward Local 
Disorder: The Evidence of the 1328 Lincolnshire Trailbaston Proceedings, in 
TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE 56-58 (J. S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Greene 
eds., 1988) (commenting on accepted scholarship that “[i]n theory, trial jurors 
were selected from local inhabitants who would be familiar with ‘the facts’ of 
the offenses . . . [and] the involvement of the accused”, but observing that 
“practice did not necessarily follow theory”). 
 19. See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary 
Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 499 
(1990). 
 20. Id.  See also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 
(3d ed. 1999).  FRIEDENTHAL notes that: 
[J]urors were expected to inform each other on the issues, relying on 
their personal knowledge of the events, and to consult any other 
reliable sources, including direct communication with the parties.  
They were entitled to decide a case on the basis of their knowledge, 
even when this contradicted the testimony. 
Id. (citing M. HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF 
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fact-finding process, at least by contemporary standards of 
juror participation.21  But the jury was forced to take a back 
seat in the proceedings as the trial became more adversarial in 
nature and attorneys asserted and expanded their role.22  Thus 
the passive jury model began its ascent to prominence and is 
the predominant model today. 
While the American colonists did not bring the entirety of 
English law across the Atlantic, one legal institution that 
colonists did transplant was the jury.23  The colonists kept the 
tradition alive before the revolution, and after the War for 
Independence, the right to a jury trial in civil matters heard in 
federal courts was “preserved” by the Seventh Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.24  The States also valued the 
civil jury; however, each state had different procedures 
 
ENGLAND 260-61 (1713)). 
 21. See Smith, supra note 15, at 387. 
 22. Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the 
Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 732 (1993).  Landsman notes that the 
decline in the use of the active jury began around 1670.  Id. at 730.  He also 
points out that other changes were also occurring at this time, such as the 
abolition of the requirement that “jurors be drawn from the exact 
neighborhood in which the case arose.”  Id.  Thus, not only was the jury 
becoming more passive, but it was also turning out to be an impartial arbiter 
of facts. 
While the emerging adversarial process undoubtedly had an impact on the 
passivity of the jury, the bench also played a role.  Indeed, “the first known 
overt restriction” on the jury was the writ of attaint.  Hon. Michael B. Dann, 
“Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic 
Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1233 (1993).  With this writ, “[i]f the judge disagreed 
strongly enough with the jury’s returned verdict”, the judge could imprison the 
jury and vacate the verdict “on the theory that the jurors perjured themselves 
in their capacities as witnesses.”  Id. 
 23. Each of the colonies was, of course, unique and utilized those aspects 
of the Common Law that suited its particular needs.  See Joseph H. Smith, 
The English Criminal Law in Early America, in JOSEPH H. SMITH & THOMAS 
G. BARNES, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM: CARRYOVER TO THE COLONIES 22-41 
(1975). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of 
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Id.  According to some commentators, the Seventh Amendment was borne of 
an attempt to curtail the “centralizing tendencies of Article III.”  Ann 
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 
594 (2001).  Indeed, not only did the Seventh Amendment interject a 
democratic element, but it also curtailed the Supreme Court’s ability to 
“review ‘both as to law and fact’” under its Article III power.  Id. at 594-95, 
597. 
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governing its use.25  The variations seen among the states 
should not lead one to question the importance of the jury to 
the citizens of early America: the right to a trial by jury was the 
only right protected by every state constitution established 
between 1776 and 1787 and is guaranteed by the constitutions 
of all fifty states today.26  As the nation of colonies rose up to 
become an industrial power-house, the authority and role of the 
jury in the civil trial waned.  During the industrial revolution, 
judges came to believe that the jury was simply incapable of 
“comprehending the new industrial reality” and was 
“irremediably biased against corporate defendants” and so 
curtailed the power of the jury accordingly.27  As happened in 
England, the once active jury withered.  Passivity became the 
norm. 
B. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY IN PATENT 
TRIALS 
The Seventh Amendment preserves the individual’s right 
to have a jury in those cases in which the common law would 
 
 25. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist 83, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 503 
(Penguin Books, 1961) (1788).  Hamilton argued: 
There is a material diversity, as well in the modification as in the 
extent of the institution of trial by jury in civil cases, in the several 
States; and from this fact these obvious reflections flow: first, that no 
general rule could have been fixed upon by the convention which 
would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States; 
and secondly, that more or at least as much might have been 
hazarded by taking the system of any one State for a standard, as by 
omitting a provision altogether and leaving the matter, as it has been 
left, to legislative regulation. 
Id. 
 26. See Smith, supra note 15, at 424-25 (1996) (citing Stephan Landsman, 
The Civil Jury Trial in America: Scenes From An Unappreciated History, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 579, 607 (1993)); see e.g., NEW YORK STATE COURT SYSTEM, 
THE JURY PROJECT, CONTINUING JURY REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 1 
(January 2001). 
 27. Smith, supra note 15, at 450-51.  Also noteworthy is the fact that the 
ability of the judge to comment on the evidence to the jury was legislatively 
curtailed in the states.  See generally Renée Lettow Lerner, The 
Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM & MARY 
L. REV. 195 (2000).  While the move to legislatively curtail the practice of 
judicial commentary was borne of a desire to mitigate the judge’s ability to 
influence the jury, it may have also had the negative effect of depriving the 
jury of a valuable resource.  See also WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND 
CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALITY 1889-1932 4 
(Bobbs Merrill Co. 1969) (describing the impact of industrialization on the 
judiciary and the reaction of ordinary Americans to judicial decisions). 
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have allowed it.28  As a result, the courts devised a historical 
test to determine whether in current times a particular litigant 
has the right to a jury trial.29  The test for determining the 
scope of the Seventh Amendment was first enunciated by 
Justice Story in United States v. Wonson.30  Since that decision, 
eighteenth-century English practice vis-à-vis the use of the jury 
in patent litigation has been guiding judicial decisions 
regarding the role of the jury in American patent trials.31  The 
historical test is relatively simple, but it has profound 
implications.  Under the test, a court must first ask “whether 
[it is] dealing with a cause of action that either was tried at law 
at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one that 
was.”32  If the cause of action would have been recognized at 
our founding, the second query is reached.  This inquiry 
considers “whether the particular trial decision must fall to the 
jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right 
as it existed in 1791.”33 
1.  At Common Law in England 
Throughout England in the eighteenth-century, the jury 
played an important role in adjudicating patent disputes.  
Since patent infringement actions could be brought both “at 
law and . . . in equity”, patentees could opt for a jury trial by 
seeking damages and then requesting a jury.34  Alternatively, a 
patentee could forgo a jury trial entirely by bringing an 
 
 28. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 29. See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C. Mass. 1812) 
(No. 16,750). 
 30. In essence, Justice Story argued that the right to a jury trial exists 
depends on whether the right existed at English common law.  Cf. id. (noting 
that “the common law [preserved by the Seventh Amendment] . . . is not the 
common law of any individual state . . . but is the common law of England”). 
 31. See Altman, supra note 2, at 704. 
 32. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
 33. Id.  Determining whether a matter would have been tried at law or 
equity is not as simple as it sounds.  Indeed, “the most erudite and lucid of 
English legal historians” could only say of equity that it “is that body of rules 
which is administered only by those Courts which are known as Courts of 
Equity.”  Devlin, supra note 10, at 45 (quoting F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1 (2d ed. 
1936)). 
 34. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see Brian D. Coggio 
& Timothy E. Demasi, The Right to A Jury Trial in Actions for Patent 
Infringement and Suits for Declaratory Judgment, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 205, 206 (2002). 
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equitable action.35  Thus, historically, it was the patentee’s 
choice of remedy that determined whether the action was at 
law or equity.36  Whether the action was legal or equitable had 
a direct impact on whether the case could or could not be tried 
by jury.37  In the English equivalent to an action seeking 
declaration of patent invalidity,38 a patentee was guaranteed 
that a jury would decide his fate.39 
2.  The American Treatment of the Jury in Patent Trials 
In America, the use of the jury in patent cases followed a 
path very similar to that in England.40  To wit, “courts broadly 
construed each of its functions to assure that the right to a trial 
by jury would be preserved.”41  Indeed, juries have participated 
in patent disputes since 1790 when the first patent statute was 
enacted.42  While it was almost always the province of the 
 
 35. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976; see Coggio & Demasi, supra note 34, 
at 205. 
 36. Coggio & Demasi, supra note 34, at 207. 
 37. Id. at 206-07. 
 38. The writ of scire facias was an action brought by the King to show why 
a patent “should not be repealed or revoked.”  In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 974 
n.9 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 
315, 360 (1888)). 
 39. Indeed, even though the writ of scire facias was brought in the 
juryless Court of Chancery (a court of equity), in such cases “the proceeding in 
chancery was suspended pending a determination by a jury summoned in the 
Court of King’s Bench”, where juries were available.  In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 
at 975 n.9. 
 40. Id. at 976, citing Marsh v. Seymore, 97 U.S. 348, 349 (1877) and Wise 
v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 33 F. 277, 278 (W.D. Mo. 1888).  Both Marsh and Wise 
held that a patentee could seek redress in either a court of law or equity; 
Coggio & Demasi, supra note 34, at 207. 
 41. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 665 (emphasis added), citing Root v. Ry. 
Co., 105 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1881) (noting that where previous acts had 
conferred “jurisdiction in patent cases in equity as well as at law”, the Court 
held that such a “distinction of jurisdiction” “is constitutional, to the extent to 
which the seventh amendment forbids any infringement of the right of trial by 
jury, as fixed by the common law”).  See also Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 
344 (1853) (a patent infringement case holding that the question of whether 
“the defendant’s [train] cars did copy the plaintiff’s invention . . . is a question 
for the jury”); Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. 218, 226 (1852) (describing 
circumstances constituting “question[s] of fact which . . . should be left to the 
jury”). 
 42. Moore, supra note 2, at 210.  See also An Act to promote the progress 
of useful Arts, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (1790) (the act entitles a patentee to 
“such damages as shall be assessed by a jury” upon a finding of infringement).  
An interesting note regarding this law is that it was enacted before the 
ratification of the Bill of Rights and, thus, the Seventh Amendment.  While 
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judiciary to resolve matters of law “the Supreme Court, in some 
instances, permitted . . . decisions [where legal and factual 
issues were intertwined] to be addressed and decided by the 
jury.”43  Through custom and by decision, the jury came to play 
an essential role in the patent trial.  From the beginning, juries 
were given complex tasks such as deciding whether the 
“specifications, including the claim, were so precise as to enable 
any person skilled in the structure of machines, to make the 
one described.”44  Jurors also decided on the “novelty of the 
invention, and [in the case of renewed patents,] whether the 
renewed patent is for the same invention as the original 
patent.”45 
In the specific context of an infringement claim then, the 
jury must first determine whether a given patent is valid.46  
Only then may it resolve the infringement question.47  While 
the jury played a vital role in individual cases historically, on 
the whole, juror participation in patent trials was infrequent.48  
In fact, bench trials “became the norm” as early as 1870 when 
the equity courts were granted the “power to award common 
law damages.”49  From that point until the late twentieth 
century, juries were an unusual object in patent litigations.  
While from 1968 until 1970, “juries decided only thirteen of 
nearly four hundred patent trials”,50 by 1999 juries tried an 
 
that fact by itself may be of little use, note that the Congress that enacted the 
1790 patent act was the same that drafted the Seventh Amendment.  This 
strongly supports arguments contending that juries should be guaranteed for 
patent actions at law.  At the very least, it is evidence that Congress 
anticipated juries would play some role in patent litigation. 
 43. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 665. 
 44. Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S. 74, 85 (1854). 
 45. Id.  The Court went on to say that “[t]here are other questions of fact 
which come within the province of a jury; such as the identity of the machine 
used by the defendant with that of the plaintiff’s, or whether they have been 
constructed and act on the same principle.”  Id. 
 46. See Stockwell, supra note 4, at 667. 
 47. Id. at 667-68.  The jury must first consider whether the patent 
application “demonstrated the necessary novelty and utility in light of any 
previous similar inventions.  If the patent holder established utility, then the 
jury had to find that the patent was also not obvious in light of the prior art.”  
Id. at 667.  Damages would then be assessed for a finding of infringement 
upon a valid patent.  Id. at 668. 
 48. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 660. 
 49. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, C. J., 
dissenting). 
 50. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 660. 
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astounding 62% of all patent trials.51 
3.  The Jury in Contemporary American Patent Litigation 
In 1979 the Ninth Circuit held that there is no 
“complexity” exception to the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial in civil cases.52  The import of such a holding is self-
evident.  The right to a jury trial in cases where one would have 
been allowed at common law cannot be abrogated simply 
because a judge determines that the case at hand is too 
complex for a jury to decide.  Without passing judgment on the 
use of the jury in complex modern patent litigations, one thing 
is certain—the role the jury plays in individual cases is 
significant.  The number of patent trials for which jurors are 
summoned when coupled with the serious consequences 
inherent in any legal decision only serves to underscore the 
importance of the issue.  This reality also demands that the 
legal community look closely at the process by which patent 
disputes are resolved. 
Reacting to this new reality in three recent cases, In re 
Lockwood,53 Hilton Davis Chemical v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,54 
and Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,55 the Federal 
Circuit and Supreme Court have undertaken a transformation 
of the role that juries play in patent trials.56 
 
 51. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 52. In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) .  The 
court not only “refuse[d] to read a complexity exception into the Seventh 
Amendment”, but it also “express[ed] grave reservations about whether a 
meaningful test could be developed were we to find such an exception.”  Id.  
The court rejected the attempt to “demean[] the intelligence of the citizens of 
this Nation.”  Id. at 430.  It noted that “[j]urors, if properly instructed and 
treated with deserved respect, bring collective intelligence, wisdom, and 
dedication to their tasks, which is rarely equalled [sic] in other areas of public 
service.”  Id.  But see In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 
1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980), (holding that the Seventh Amendment does not 
guarantee the right to jury trial when “a jury will not be able to perform its 
task of rational decision[-]making with a reasonable understanding of the 
evidence and the relevant legal standards” and concluding that “[i]n lawsuits 
of this complexity, the interests protected by this procedural rule of due 
process carry greater weight than the interests served by the constitutional 
guarantee of jury trial”). 
 53. 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 54. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 55. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 56. Mark B. Watson, Expansion, Compression and Relief: An Analysis of 
the Jury’s Role in Patent Infringement Cases Employing the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 91, 99-100 (1996).  Watson points 
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a.  In re Lockwood 
In the first of the trilogy, In re Lockwood, patentee 
Lockwood (“Patentee”) brought an infringement action against 
an airline.57  While both equitable and non-equitable relief was 
sought, only equitable claims remained after American’s 
motion for summary judgment was granted on the 
infringement issue.58  An important question was thus raised—
could the patentee still receive a jury trial even though the only 
remaining claim was equitable in nature?  On rehearing, the 
Federal Circuit held that since the core controversy in the case 
was a patent infringement action “in which the affirmative 
defense of invalidity has been pled”, the patentee’s “right to a 
jury trial must be determined accordingly.”59  Thus, even 
though the remaining action was equitable in nature, the court 
 
out that in Markman, the court restricted the role of the jury by holding that 
“claim interpretation is a question of law for the court to decide,” while the 
Hilton Davis court expanded the jury’s role by ruling that the “determination 
of equivalence” is a fact-question and is thus within the province of the jury.  
Watson, supra, at 99 nn.62-63.  In equivalence patent infringement cases, the 
Federal Circuit has shown a willingness to disregard jury verdicts.  Id. at 102. 
Watson reports that in at least three cases, the Federal Circuit has affirmed 
district court decisions overruling jury verdicts.  Id. at 100-02.  In Newell Co. 
v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the jury came back with its 
verdict that the plaintiff’s patent “was not obvious, but that the defendant did 
in fact, infringe on it.”  Watson, supra, at 101.  The district court overturned 
the jury verdict and “the Federal Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district 
court stating that there was ‘no legal error’ in holding that the patent was 
obvious.” Id. 
In the case of Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., the jury found that the 
plaintiff’s patent had been infringed and awarded him $950,000 in damages.  
952 F.2d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Claiming that there was “insufficient to 
support a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents”, the 
district court overturned the verdict.  Id. at 1327.  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed. Id. at 1328. 
Finally, in the famous Markman case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff patentee, but the district court promptly “granted the defendant’s 
motion for a [Judgment as a Matter of Law].”  Watson, supra, at 103.  Again, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 104.  On review, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Federal Circuit.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370 (1996). 
 57. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  Specifically, 
Patentee alleged that American Airlines had infringed his patents relating to 
“self-service terminals and automatic ticket dispensing systems.”  Id. 
 58. See id. at 968-69; Altman, supra note 2, at 708-09. 
 59. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 974.  The court noted, “the primary 
difference between American’s action and the infringement suit that would 
formerly have been required for an adjudication of validity is that the parties’ 
positions here have been inverted.”  Id. at 974-75. 
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concluded that it was more important that the patentee control 
whether a particular action would be eligible for a jury trial. 
b.  Hilton Davis 
Hilton Davis represents the Federal Circuit’s affirmation of 
the sanctity of the jury verdict in patent cases.  In that case the 
court in an en banc rehearing asked the parties to address 
whether “the issue of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents60 [was] an equitable remedy to be decided by the 
court, or . . . like literal infringement, . . . [was] an issue of fact 
to be submitted to the jury.”61  The court held that the issue of 
infringement was undoubtedly a question of fact.62  In so 
holding the Federal Circuit is in good company.  In Graver 
Tank the Supreme Court held that a finding of equivalence was 
“a determination of fact.”63  Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded  
“infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of 
fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury trial.”64  The decision 
“shocked” a legal community still reeling from the Markman 
decision.65  In practice, however, Hilton Davis did not 
reinvigorate the role of the jury in patent trials as much as 
Markman destroyed it—the court retained the power of claim 
determination.66  It is the Markman case to which this Note 
now turns. 
 
 60. The doctrine of equivalents refers to an action brought by a patentee 
in which there is not a literal infringement of the patent, but where the 
“infringing” device performs “substantially the same function in substantially 
the same way to obtain the same result.”  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air 
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950); Watson, supra note 56, at 91 (explaining 
the difference between literal infringement and infringement based on the 
equivalence doctrine). 
 61. Hilton Davis Chem. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 62. See id. at 1520 (noting that this issue had been firmly resolved by the 
Supreme Court).  See Graver Tank, 399 U.S. at 609-10. 
 63. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609. 
 64. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522. 
 65. Watson, supra note 56, at 109-10, 111-12.  Indeed, Watson points out 
that the court itself was not in total agreement over the outcome, as it drew 
three dissenting opinions.  Id. at 110-11.  Watson also notes, “[p]rior to the 
Hilton decision, many felt that the doctrine of equivalents was an equitable 
remedy, and thus not on the same level as statutory literal infringement.”  Id. 
at 114. 
 66. Watson, supra note 56, at 112. 
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c.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
In Markman the Supreme Court addressed whether claim 
interpretation lay within the province of the judge or the jury.67  
At trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of Markman on the 
infringement claim, but the court granted Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict against Markman because it 
disagreed with the jury over its interpretation of the claim.68  
Both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the 
action by the lower court.69  The Court reasoned that the 
“history and precedent” on the topic suffered from a lack of 
perspicuity on the issue of whether the judge or jury should 
“define terms of art.”70  The inquiry is basically this: Which of 
the two parties “is better positioned . . . to decide the issue in 
question”?71  Since the “construction of written documents” has 
often been found to be within the province of the judge, the 
court thought it wise to hold that claim construction was 
exclusively for the judge to perform.72 
d.  The Jury’s Role 
In patent trials, as in any jury trial, the role of the jury is 
to resolve questions of fact.73  Indeed, the role of the jury has 
been confined exclusively to fact-finding since the Supreme 
Court resolved the issue in Sparf v. United States in 1895.74  As 
 
 67. Markman, 517 U.S. at 375. 
 68. Id. at 375-76.  The disagreement stems from divergent interpretations 
of the word “inventory.”  Id. at 375.  The jury apparently interpreted that word 
to mean only cash inventory (which results in an infringement of Markman’s 
patent).  Id.  The court, on the other hand, interpreted inventory to mean 
physical inventory only, which means that there can be no infringement of the 
patent unless the infringing system can track both types.  Id.; Altman, supra 
note 2, at 713. 
 69. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970, 988-89 
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. 
 70. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part 1), 
83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 797 (2001).  Signore noted that 
while the fact-law distinction usually holds true, there are exceptions to the 
rule.  Id.  For example, the issue of whether a patentee committed inequitable 
conduct before the United States Patent and Trademark Office is “sometimes 
reserved for the judge because of the equitable nature of the overall issue.”  Id. 
 74. 156 U.S. 51, 101-03 (1895) (holding in the context of the criminal trial, 
that when the jury ceases to be bound to apply the law as the judge has stated 
it, society would become imperiled as “our government . . . cease[s] to be a 
government of laws, and become[s] a government of men.  Liberty regulated by 
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important as that distinction is, the general notion that the 
jury is a “fact-finder” is unhelpful given the myriad decisions 
that have shaped the role of the jury and its interplay with the 
judge.  Therefore, this section will address the various parts of 
a patent trial.  There are at least five main parts in any patent 
trial.75  First, the claim must be interpreted.76  As the prior 
section demonstrated, that job has been delegated to the 
judge.77  The second issue to be addressed is the validity of the 
patent involved.78  The issue of validity too, has been 
determined to be a question of law.79  However, since the issue 
of validity is usually wrapped up in fact questions, “courts often 
let the jury decide the validity issue.”80  The third matter is 
whether infringement has occurred.81  It is well settled that the 
determination of patent infringement requires a factual inquiry 
and is therefore most appropriately placed into the jurors’ 
hands.82  The fourth question that must be answered is 
whether the patent is unenforceable due to fraudulent or 
 
law is the underlying principal of our institutions”). 
 75. See Signore, supra note 73, at 799-810. 
 76. Id. at 799. 
 77. See supra Part II.B.3.c and accompanying notes.  Moreover, in 
addition to being the first part of a patent trial, claim interpretation is also 
probably “the most important issue in a patent litigation because it affects the 
findings on the validity, infringement, and enforceability of the patent.”  
Signore, supra note 73, at 799. 
 78. Signore, supra note 73, at 800. 
 79. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 
147, 155 (1950); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 
(1966). 
 80. Signore, supra note 73, at 800.  Signore also notes that while the jury 
usually decides whether a patent is valid or not, since the issue is one of law 
and not fact, the decision remains “reviewable on appeal de novo.”  Id.  Among 
the numerous mixed fact-law questions that the jury must decide are the 
utility of the infringed patent, whether “a person of ordinary skill in the art in 
the field of the invention” could “make and use the claimed invention” based 
on the patent (enablement), and whether the patent contains a valid, “written 
description of the claimed invention.”  Id. at 801-02.  Additionally, the jury 
must determine whether the patent describes the “best mode of carrying out 
the claimed invention”, whether the claimed invention is novel, whether the 
patentee has lost his right to a patent because of prior sale or use, and finally, 
the issue of obviousness, though a legal conclusion, has been left for the jury 
since it factual issues envelop the inquiry.  Id. at 802-05. 
 81. See Signore, supra note 73, at 805. 
 82. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 
(1950) (“A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact.”); see also, SRI Int’l 
v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1125 (1985) (“It is settled 
that the question of infringement (literal or by equivalents) is factual.”). 
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inequitable conduct by the patentee.83  Finally, while the court 
has the power to determine what the character of the damages 
will be (e.g., actual damages and a reasonable royalty), it is the 
jury that decides the “amount of a prevailing party’s 
damages.”84  As can be seen, though it has been limited, the 
jury continues to have a significant role in patent litigations.  
But the significant task jurors have been called upon to 
perform coupled with the hyper-technicality of modern patent 
trials has led many to question whether the lay jury is up to the 
challenge. 
C. TAKING ISSUE: QUESTIONING THE COMPETENCY OF LAY 
JURORS 
Lay jurors play an important role in patent litigation, but 
their function and utility have come under fire in recent 
years.85  Indeed one commentator has stated that “[t]he worst 
problem with the patent system in my opinion is juries in the 
patent system.”86  At the same time, others argue that the 
problem is not as severe as so many perceive it to be.87  
Nevertheless, as technologies that are the object of patents 
become more complex, most commentators argue jurors are less 
likely to comprehend the task before them.88  The response 
from academia and the legal field has been heated, and the 
solutions proposed are diverse.  For the most part, however, 
there are two categories of reform proposals: those dealing with 
the role and characteristics of the jury and those dealing with 
 
 83. See Signore, supra at note 73, at 808. 
 84. Smithkline Diagnostics v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 
(1991) (emphasis added). 
 85. See Altman, supra note 2, at 699. 
 86. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 660. 
 87. See Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part 
II), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 896 (2001) (noting that in reality only 
a “few patent cases are tried by juries”).  Since the role of the jury in those 
cases can be limited, Signore argues that the impact of uncomprehending 
jurors on the overall system is “relatively small.”  Id. at 897. 
 88. See Stockwell, supra note 4, at 645 (noting that today’s technology is a 
world apart from the technologies driving the industrial revolution); Fisher, 
supra note 4, at 1 (noting how as the complexity of patented technologies 
increases, the ability of jurors to understand the issues may suffer); but see 
John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in 
Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 766, 770 (2000) 
(noting that the presence of a jury has had a positive impact as well.  For 
example, “[t]he presence of the jury forces simplification and acceleration of 
trials once they begin, and is likely to reduce interruptions”). 
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the role and characteristics of the judge.89  This section will 
look at those proposed solutions. 
1.  Reforming Patent Litigation: The Special Jury 
While several different solutions have been put forth, the 
one that appears to be most popular is the utilization of an old 
common law practice—the special jury.90  Stockwell argues that 
because the right to a trial by jury necessarily implies that the 
jury be properly equipped for its job, Congress should mandate 
that those in the jury pool have training similar to that of 
“patent practitioners” required by the Patent and Trademark 
Office.91  Such a jury, it is thought, would be in a position to 
understand the issues presented at trial because of its 
members’ specialized education.92  There are variants of this 
proposal as well.  For example, at least one scheme would 
create a mixed jury composed of lay jurors as well as “special” 
jurors.93  This diversification would be accomplished either by 
creating a jury pool consisting of at least forty percent special 
jurors or by having two pools of jurors, from which a certain 
number would be selected.94 
2.  Reforming Patent Litigation: Specialized Courts 
The second school of thought proposes that the judiciary 
itself become more specialized so that it can be more adept at 
adjudicating cases involving modern technological realities.95  
 
 89. See e.g., Fisher, supra note 4; Signore, supra note 87.  See also LeRoy 
L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through 
Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. 1, 
11 (2002), at http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/01_020309_kondo.php 
 90. Fisher, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that the practice of having 
merchant jurors hear trade disputes goes back to the fourteenth century, and 
the practice of utilizing special juries also has a history in the United States).  
For a detailed account of the use of the special jury, see James C. Oldham, The 
Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (1983). 
 91. Stockwell, supra note 4, at 685-86. 
 92. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that using such expert jurors in 
patent infringement cases would be “particularly beneficial” and “is arguably 
the only realistic way to achieve a just result”); Stockwell, supra note 4, at 661 
(noting that “[a] panel of technically trained individuals would be in a better 
position, than a judge trained in law, to understand and resolve the issues 
associated with the patent infringement.  Furthermore, such a panel would 
certainly be a marked improvement over the current traditional jury system”). 
 93. Signore, supra note 87, at 900. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Kondo, supra note 89, at 11. 
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As a model for this specialization, Professor Kondo argues that 
reformers should look to the states, as they have successfully 
created “business courts, adult drug courts, family courts, 
juvenile drug courts, teen courts, [and] domestic violence 
courts.”96  More important than the number of courts that 
numerous states have created is the fact that the specialization 
has had the effect of making decisions more consistent and 
giving the specialist judges more credibility.97  If the federal 
court system would create specialty trial courts to deal with 
patent litigation, it would allow the courts to have a “greater 
uniformity of judgment.”98  In addition, specialization could 
occur with relatively minor changes.99  For example, while it 
would be ideal to have specially trained judges on the bench, 
specialization could occur simply by utilizing experts, special 
masters, and technical advisors who would assist the 
judiciary.100 
3.  Reducing Juror Passivity: An Inquisitorial Approach 
The method advocated by this Note, and the third 
approach to reform, is to reduce juror passivity in the 
courtroom.  This Note argues that reducing juror passivity has 
the most potential to cure a defective jury trial process in 
patent litigation.101  Juror passivity would be reduced in three 
ways.  First, jurors would be allowed to take notes during 
trial.102  Importantly, those notes could be used during 
deliberations.103  Second, jurors would be allowed to question 
witnesses.104  As will be discussed infra part III.C.2, this is one 
of the more controversial reform proposals; however, 
restrictions could be put into place that would alleviate many of 
the concerns brought about by such a procedure.105  Finally, 
jurors should be allowed to discuss the case among themselves 
 
 96. Id. at 14. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 16. 
 99. Id. at 24. 
 100. Id. at 24, 28. 
 101. See generally infra Part III.C. 
 102. See Tom M. Dees III, Juries: On the Verge of Extinction? A Discussion 
of Jury Reform, 54 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1773 (2001). 
 103. See id. 
 104. See Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the 
Adversarial Ideal, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 90-91 (2002). 
 105. See Dann, supra note 22, at 1254-55. 
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during the course of the trial.106  These reforms, while not 
perfect, would go a long way towards improving jurors’ abilities 
to comprehend complex cases and to decide them correctly. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 I am by no means enamored of jury trials, at least in civil cases, but it 
is certainly inconsistent to trust them so reverently as we do, and still 
to surround them with restrictions which if they have any rational 
validity whatever, depend upon distrust.107 
The proposals as set forth are not flawless.  While each has 
the potential to increase the predictability and improve the 
accuracy of the jury trial, the faults that exist must be 
considered.  This section will address the strengths and 
shortcomings of the two approaches to reform the current 
patent litigation process rejected by this Note. 
A. THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL: SETTING THE BAR HIGHER 
In response to the perceived problem of juror 
incompetence, commentators have proposed the use of special, 
or expert, juries in patent disputes.108  Special juries would 
have several advantages over the current lay jury model.109  
Among the advantages noted by Fisher, the most notable is the 
increased likelihood that jurors will be able to comprehend the 
issues in the case.110  In addition, given the standard for 
determining patent validity, it is likely that jurors familiar 
with the technological arts at issue in the litigation would be 
better equipped to make a rational decision.111  Not only would 
a special jury be a useful tool in patent litigation, there is also 
historical support for its use in other contexts.112  Most 
commonly the special jury was used in disputes between 
 
 106. See id. at 1262. 
 107. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the 
Matter, in LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS: 1921-1922, at 89, 101 (James N. 
Rosenberg et al. eds., 1926). 
 108. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 80; Stockwell, supra note 4, at 682.  
Moreover, it is likely that this increased level of juror comprehension would 
lead to more predictable and more stable decisions, thus eliminating one of the 
largest perceived problems.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 110. Fisher, supra note 4, at 90. 
 111. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Oldham, supra note 90, at 139 and accompanying text.  Among 
the special juries that have been used, historically, is the trial de medietate 
linguae, which consisted of a jury of half foreigners. 
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merchants.113  In those cases the jury was composed of 
merchants who would decide the case.114 
It is clear that a special jury composed of engineers or 
other “experts” would have the tendency to improve the 
accuracy of the fact-finding ability of the jury.  Moreover, it is 
likely that, given the historical support for special juries, such a 
practice would probably survive a constitutional attack.115  
Even though there exists historical support for the use of 
special juries in certain cases, that alone is not reason enough 
to revive the tradition.116  Several problems exist that call the 
feasibility of such a system into question.  Moreover, other 
reforms exist that might mitigate the necessity of such a 
drastic step.117 
 
 113. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that the practice of using a jury 
in mercantile disputes “goes back at least to the fourteenth century”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. But see Fisher, supra note 4, at 19-23 (describing the possibility that a 
special jury might violate the Equal Protection Clause since the practice might 
not comport with the “fair cross section” requirement that jury selection 
requires). 
 116. Indeed, while the historical context is very important—as this Note 
strenuously maintains—it is but one factor in the analysis.  While study of the 
historical antecedents of various institutions allows for a more informed 
approach to reforming the current versions of those institutions, it also must 
be remembered that many institutions have passed on into the dustbin of 
history for a reason.  For example, until relatively recently, citizens of some 
states could not serve on a jury unless they met certain property 
requirements.  While the belief was that such qualifications resulted in a jury 
composed of individuals less prone to bribery, few would argue that such a 
system should be revived.  See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief 
History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 
(1994). 
 117. See discussion infra Section III.C.  Indeed, it is the position of this 
Note that such a step is not as urgent as others suggest.  Fisher argues that 
the use of a lay jury in certain patent cases may be unconstitutional—a 
violation of due process.  See Fisher, supra note 4, at 13-16.  This 
characterization of the jury is unreasonable and most unfortunate.  As Fisher 
points out, the Third Circuit did hold that “[d]ue process requires that jurors 
be sane and competent during trial.”  Id. at 5.  It has also been held that “due 
process is violated by a jury incapable of rendering a rational verdict.” Id. at 
13.  Fisher then takes the leap to argue that “if a non-expert jury is utterly 
incapable of comprehending the technology in a patent case, can its decision-
making be any more rational than that of an insane jury?  The answer must 
surely be no.”  Id. at 47. 
With regard to the analogy between a potentially insane juror experiencing 
delusions and paranoid schizophrenia, see Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465, 466 
(2d Cir. 1980), and a lay jury deciding a complex case, the error should be 
readily apparent.  In the former case, the fear is that the particular juror had 
lost all ability to reason; in the latter instance, jurors retain all of their 
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While using a special jury may have the desired effect of 
improving the accuracy of the fact-finding process, the practice 
of convening expert juries in complex patent cases raises 
significant problems.  Even if one believes that, in principle, 
special juries are a good thing, one still must face the realities 
of the jury selection process.  Implementation of a special jury 
in real cases and on the scale envisioned would create an 
administrative mess.  For example, Fisher proposes that the 
courts develop separate jury wheels, “one for ordinary jurors, 
and one for each type of technology likely to arise in patent 
litigation.”118  Moreover, in cases involving multiple specialties, 
Fisher proposes that the court “require each juror to have a 
background in at least one discipline related to the patents in 
dispute.”119  The problem with such a solution is that it is 
simply unworkable.  Not only would it be difficult to target all 
of those with special expertise, label them, place them into 
categories, and then wait until a lawsuit springs up, but it 
would also be difficult to keep such individuals on a jury.  It 
must not be forgotten that ultimately, it is the attorneys who 
play the most significant role in jury selection.  Considering the 
current practice of weeding out more intelligent jurors, it is 
difficult to see how this kind of scheme would work. 
 
faculties; however, they lack a technical education.  This Note is in agreement 
with the Ninth Circuit in that the onus for ensuring juror comprehension 
should fall onto the backs of the attorneys.  See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 
F.2d 411, 427 (9th Cir. 1979).  The court further noted that “[w]hether a case 
is tried to a jury or to a judge, the task of the attorney remains the same.  The 
attorney must organize and assemble a complex mass of information into a 
form which is understandable to the uninitiated.”  Id. 
Courts in other circuits have also followed the Ninth Circuit lead.  Indeed, a 
district court in the Sixth Circuit criticized the rationale of the Third Circuit.  
In Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., the court noted: 
Those who claim that juries cannot understand complex civil cases 
improperly demean the intelligence of the citizens of this nation, and 
do not understand the jury system . . . . 
 
Those who would seek an “elitest” [sic] approach to the use of the jury 
trial would undermine one of the most fundamental of our rights.  
There is no complexity exception to a jury trial that would authorize 
the denial of a jury when it is otherwise available under the Seventh 
Amendment. 
Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
 118. Fisher, supra note 4, at 67. 
 119. Id. at 71. 
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B. SPECIALIZATION OF THE COURTS 
The second major type of reform that has been proposed is 
potentially the most drastic depending on how it is 
implemented.  If the judiciary is specialized and the civil jury is 
eliminated in such courtrooms, unique constitutional 
challenges will follow.  If, on the other hand, the judiciary is 
specialized without curtailing the Seventh Amendment right to 
a civil trial by jury, the constitutional questions vanish. 
Specialization of the district courts would have several 
advantages over the current scheme.  Indeed, the advantages of 
specialized courts have led to widespread acceptance of them 
abroad.120  For example, in England patent trials take place in 
the Patents Court, a division of the Chancery Division.121  In 
1990 Parliament created the Patents County Court—”a small 
claimants’ court, suitable for disputes between small and 
medium-sized entities.”122  Japan has also begun to create 
specialized courts for patent infringement cases.123  Even the 
United States has experimented with specialization by way of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
which was created in 1982.124  That court was given “exclusive 
jurisdiction over [Patent and Trademark Office] appeals for 
both patent denials and interference proceedings.”125  Thus far, 
the Federal Circuit has been effective at not only delineating 
“patent law doctrine”, but it has become the “de facto ‘court of 
last resort’ for patent cases.”126  Consonant with its purpose, in 
the relatively short period of time since its inception, the 
Federal Circuit has “already provided some degree of 
uniformity and predictability to the area of intellectual 
property law.”127 
While specialization of the judiciary poses no constitutional 
problems in and of itself,128 problems arise when the 
 
 120. See Pegram, supra note 88, at 773-80. 
 121. Id. at 774. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 776-77. 
 124. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No 97-164, 96 
Stat. 25 (1982), codified as 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000). 
 125. Kondo, supra note 89, at 15 (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. at 20. 
 127. Id. at 20. 
 128. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”) (emphasis added). 
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specialization includes eliminating the use of the civil jury in 
violation of the Seventh Amendment.129  To pass constitutional 
muster, any reform proposal would have to allow litigants the 
opportunity to have cases heard by a jury if that would have 
been allowed at common law.130  Thus, the challenges created 
by the use of a lay jury remain. 
C. REFORMING THE JURY: REDUCING JUROR PASSIVITY AS A 
WAY OF IMPROVING JUROR ACCURACY 
As has been stated, those seeking to transform jury trials 
in the patent litigation context generally fall into one of two 
potentially overlapping camps. The first camp consists of those 
who argue that the characteristics of the jury are to blame for 
the ills observed.131  They claim that the jurors comprising the 
jury are uneducated and unable to comprehend the subject 
matter of the patent disputes before them.  The second camp 
has challenged Congress to create specialty courts where 
judges would have similar qualifications to those currently 
practicing patent law.132  Within this proposal there are two 
possibilities—the specialty court could either sit with a jury 
when one is requested or it could sit by itself.  As argued 
earlier, the latter is an unacceptable abridgment of the Seventh 
Amendment.133  One commonality that exists between both 
camps is that they both seek to improve the accuracy and 
efficacy of the patent litigation process by use of individuals 
specifically trained in the technical sciences.  Of those 
advocating reform of the patent litigation process specifically 
(as opposed to complex litigation generally), few have taken the 
approach advocated by this Note. 
So long as the jury remains in use in patent litigations, 
problems will remain with regard to juror comprehension of 
complex facts and the law not because of the intelligence or 
educational stature of jurors, but because of the procedures 
 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; cf. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 
750 (C.C. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (holding that the facts tried by a jury are 
never re-examined, unless a new trial is granted by the trial court or the 
judgment of the trial court is reversed by a writ of error). 
 130. U.S. CONST. amend VII; see Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750; see also supra 
section II.B. 
 131. See infra section II.C.1. 
 132. See infra section II.C.2. 
 133. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text. 
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surrounding the jury trial.134  Even if the reforms described 
supra at section II.C.1 and section II.C.2 were carried out, 
problems would remain because of the restrictive procedures 
that envelop the jury trial.  This Note contends that the 
procedural barriers have been put into place because of one 
assumption, which is that a neutral decision maker must be a 
passive one.135  Jurors today are relegated to the role of 
observer.  They “are not permitted to ask questions and in some 
jurisdictions are not even allowed to take notes.  They are 
instructed to refrain from speaking with one another and with 
outsiders for the duration of the trial.  They are instructed to 
hold off reaching a conclusion until the final deliberations.”136  
This Note advocates a tempered return to the inquisitorial, 
active jury model as a way of improving the ability of the jury 
to perform its fact-finding role and increasing its level of 
comprehension and understanding of the issues in patent 
cases.137  While numerous lawyers and judges will reject such 
proposals out of a “fear of losing total control over the trial and 
fact-finding processes”, such measures are essential to the 
viability of the jury trial process.138 
1.  Juror Note-Taking 
One of the easiest ways of boosting juror comprehension 
and understanding of the evidence in patent cases would be to 
allow jurors to take notes during the trial and to use those 
notes during deliberations.139  While the reform is not without 
detractors,140 by and large, there is a growing consensus that 
 
 134. See Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of 
Juries, Jurors: The Power of 12 1 at ¶ 2 (November 1994) [hereinafter Jurors: 
The Power of 12]; see generally Dees, supra note 102 (discussing the Arizona 
jury reform proposals). 
 135. See Hans, supra note 104, at 87 (noting that adversarial system is 
premised on the assumption that a neutral arbitrator must be passive). 
 136. Id. at 89-90. 
 137. See discussion supra at section II.A (describing the active nature of 
the early petit jury). 
 138. Dann, supra note 22, at 1236-37. 
 139. See Jurors: Power of 12, supra note 134, at 83; but cf. Dees, supra note 
102, at 1773 (discussing criticism of the proposal to allow jurors to take notes 
during trial). 
 140. Dees provides a list of ten criticisms of juror note taking: 
[(1)] jurors who take notes may participate more effectively in jury 
deliberations than those who do not; [(2)] jurors may miss important 
testimony because they are busy writing down every detail; [(3)] 
jurors may be less attentive to witnesses’ behavior and demeanor, 
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such a reform would have significant benefits.141  Both the 
Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of 
Juries and the Supreme Court of Texas Jury Task Force have 
found that the benefits outweigh any disadvantages that may 
exist.142  While allowing jurors to take notes during trial is a 
small and, arguably, non-controversial reform, it would go a 
long way towards rectifying the problem of reduced juror 
retention of information and material presented.143  Allowing 
juror note-taking is an important step, but in isolation, it can 
do little to improve the ability of jurors to understand the 
material presented at trial. 
 
which are important characteristics to note when assessing credibility 
of witnesses; [(4)] jurors may take notes of inadmissible or stricken 
material and accentuate irrelevant things while ignoring more 
substantial issues; [(5)] jurors may attach significance to their notes 
simply because they are in writing; [(6)] researches have found a 
correlation between the best note takers and those who dominate 
deliberation, which is dangerous because several jurors could come to 
rely upon one juror’s notes, which may include irrelevant or stricken 
material, or be lacking in significant detail; [(7)] a dishonest juror 
could sway the verdict by falsifying notes; [(8)] jurors who take notes 
may be listened to more carefully during deliberations simply because 
they have what purports to be a summary of the testimony and if 
inaccurate or selective, this can be dangerous; [(9)] notes, because 
they are in writing, can fall into the wrong hands and make public a 
juror’s most private thoughts; [and (10)] note taking can encourage 
jurors to write books and such a juror might try to influence the 
course of deliberations and the outcome of the case to make for a 
better story to tell. 
Dees, supra note 102, at 1773 (citing Supreme Court of Texas-Jury Reform 
Task Force, Final Report (Sep. 8, 1997), available at 
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/jurytaskforce/index.htm). 
 141. See Dees, supra note 102, at 1773-74; Dann, supra note 22, at 1251-52; 
Jurors: Power of 12, supra note 134, at 83.  The Arizona Supreme Court 
Committee on More Effective Use of Juries noted that: “Experience has shown 
that the obvious benefits of the practice . . . outweigh any supposed 
drawbacks. . . .  Jurors should be able to review their own notes during any 
recess.”  Id.  The authors of the study discovered that the practice resulted in 
increased attentiveness of the jurors at trial.  Id.  The practice also  improved 
juror memory recollection, reduced the frequency of and need for “court 
reporter readbacks of testimony” during deliberations, and left jurors with 
higher morale and increased satisfaction.  Id.  Additionally, in Arizona, where 
juror note taking is commonplace, “[n]o material disadvantages have 
surfaced.”  Id. at 83-84. 
 142. Jurors: Power of 12, supra note 134, at 83-84; Dees, supra note 102, at 
1774 (noting that the Supreme Court of Texas Jury Task Force concluded that 
the prohibition on juror note taking was based on faulty assumptions). 
 143. See supra discussion at II.C.3 (explaining three ways juror passivity 
can be reduced, including by allowing jurors to take notes during trial). 
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2.  Allowing Jurors to Question Witnesses 
One way to improve the ability of jurors to comprehend the 
evidence at trial would be to allow them to ask questions 
during the course of the proceedings.144  This reform is perhaps 
the most controversial and indeed, it involves a significant 
departure from the current adversarial process towards “its 
inquisitorial cousin.”145  Despite the drastic nature of this 
reform, some jurisdictions have already put it into place.146  
Indeed, the United States military has in place a system 
whereby members:147 
[M]ay request to call or recall witnesses, interrogate witnesses, take 
notes during trial and use them in the deliberation room, request 
during deliberations that the court-martial be reopened and portions 
of the record be read to them or additional evidence introduced, and 
take written instructions with them into the deliberation room.148 
In the non-military federal context, such a reform would be 
easily implemented, procedurally, since a plausible reading of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence appears to allow individual 
judges to permit the practice.149  In fact, several circuits have 
“uniformly concluded that juror questioning is a permissible 
practice, the allowance of which is within a judge’s 
discretion.”150  Despite that uniformity, those same courts have 
 
 144. See Hans, supra note 104, at 90-91; Dann, supra note 22, at 1253-55; 
Dees, supra note 102, at 1774-78. 
 145. See Hans, supra note 104, at 90. 
 146. Of states that have begun the process of jury reform, while Texas Jury 
Task Force recommended that jurors not be allowed to ask questions, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, and the District of Columbia all either endorse or are 
considering allowing juror questioning in civil trials.  Dees, supra note 102, at 
1778.  Additionally, the United States Military also allows such questioning.  
See generally David A. Anderson, Let Jurors Talk: Authorizing Pre-
Deliberation Discussion of the Evidence During Trial, 174 MIL. L. REV. 92 
(2002). 
 147. Members are the military equivalent to jurors.  Anderson, supra note 
146, at 92. 
 148. Id. at 92-93. 
 149. FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (allowing the judge or magistrate to “exercise 
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and 
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation 
effective for the ascertainment of truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of 
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment”).  
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[t]here is nothing improper about 
the practice of allowing occasional questions from jurors to be asked of 
witnesses. If a juror is unclear as to a point in the proof, it makes good 
common sense to allow a question to be asked about it.”  United States v. 
Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 150. United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1995). 
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clearly expressed their disapproval of the procedure.151 
There are in essence three different approaches for 
enabling juror questioning of witnesses.  This Note advocates 
adoption of either one of two.152  The first method, which is not 
advocated by this Note, allows jurors to question witnesses 
orally during the course of the trial.153  The second mode of 
questioning would have jurors submit anonymous, written 
questions to the court.154  After submission the “jury and 
witness leave the courtroom”, and the judge rules on the 
admissibility of the questions.155  The attorneys would also 
have the opportunity to object.156  Assuming the questions are 
admissible, the judge would ask the questions of the witness 
and the attorneys would then be able to “ask follow-up 
questions limited to the subject matter of the jurors’ 
questions.”157  Finally, the third method would have the jurors 
submit written questions to the court only to be passed on to 
the attorneys who could do with the question as they wish.158 
Of course, the ability of the jurors to ask questions would 
not be unlimited.  Indeed, two limitations have already been 
discussed.  Namely that the questions must be in writing and 
are then dealt with by the attorneys and judge outside of the 
jury’s presence.  Additional safeguards could also be 
 
 151. Id. (noting that the general consensus is that jurors should only be 
allowed to question witnesses in extraordinary circumstances).  One argument 
against the practice of juror questioning is that “[w]hen acting as inquisitors, 
jurors can find themselves removed from their appropriate role as neutral 
fact-finders.”  Id.  While the elimination of juror neutrality is a real concern, 
one should not conflate participation in the fact-finding process with 
partiality—a neutral juror need not be a passive one.  See supra note 135 and 
accompanying text. 
 152. See Dees, supra note 102, at 1774-75. 
 153. One serious problem that can arise when jurors are allowed to ask 
questions orally, without being first filtered through the court is that counsel 
will be unable to object to any of the questions asked “for fear of antagonizing, 
alienating or embarrassing a juror.”  United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 
719, 724 (3d Cir.1999).  Given that alternative approaches exist, this Note 
argues that oral questioning by jurors would not be the appropriate solution.  
The serious consequences that can accompany oral questioning by jurors can 
be mitigated, perhaps even eliminated, by use of written questions, filtered 
through the attorneys and judge. 
 154. See Dees, supra note 102, at 1775. 
 155. Id. (quoting Judge Ken Curry & M. Beth Krugler, The Sound of 
Silence: Are Silent Juries the Best Juries?, 62 Tex. B.J. 441, 442 (May 1999). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (quoting Curry & Krugler, supra note 155, at 442). 
 158. Id. 
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implemented, such as a precautionary warning to the jurors 
that they “not attach any significance to the failure of the judge 
to ask a requested question since rules of law may prevent 
some questions from being asked.”159 
Since the major concern of those seeking to reform the way 
in which patent cases are tried is the ability of the jury to 
understand the evidence and subject matter before them, 
allowing the jurors to ask questions should be a welcome 
proposal.  Although many legal practitioners are hostile to the 
idea of allowing juror questioning, so long as jurors are not 
allowed to engage in the practice, the effectiveness of all other 
reforms is placed in jeopardy.  The benefits that would accrue 
by implementation of this reform outweigh the risks.160  
Moreover, such a practice would take far fewer resources than 
would the traditional reforms proposed for patent cases.161  The 
jury developed because of its unique ability to discover the facts 
of the case; the inability of jurors to actively participate in the 
presentation of evidence obstructs the one task the jury was 
designed to perform—discover truth.162 
3.  Pre-Deliberation Discussion of the Evidence: Losing the 
Requirement that Jurors Not Discuss the Case Amongst 
Themselves 
One of the hallmarks of the traditional passive juror model 
is the admonition to jurors forbidding them from discussing the 
case or evidence amongst themselves until deliberations have 
begun—after all the evidence has been submitted.163  The 
 
 159. Dann, supra note 22, at 1255.  The State of Arizona’s Supreme Court 
Committee on the More Effective Use of Juries proposed that jurors be: 
[A]llowed to ask question during trials of civil and criminal cases, 
subject to careful judicial supervision.  At a minimum the safeguards 
should include: telling the jurors in advance of trial of the procedures 
to be followed; having questions put in writing and left unsigned; 
discussing the question with the attorneys and allowing them to 
object to the question out of the jury’s presence; the asking of the 
question of the witness by the judge; and telling the jurors that the 
law may prevent some of their questions from being asked. 
Jurors: Power of 12, supra note 134, at 90. 
 160. Dann, supra note 22, at 1253. 
 161. See discussion and notes at section III.A (indeed, even the creation of 
new specialty courts would require the expenditure of immense resources). 
 162. See discussion and notes at section II.A. 
 163. See Jurors: The Power of 12, supra note 134, at 96; Dann, supra note 
22, at 1262; Dees, supra note 102, at 1782-84; Anderson, supra note 146, at 94-
95. 
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controversy created by this reform proposal rivals allowing 
juror questioning of witnesses.  But if a goal of reforming the 
trial process is accuracy in fact-finding, then this reform is 
essential.  The traditional rule is grounded in a view of the 
average juror that is simply not based in reality.164  Jurors do 
not passively absorb information and are not “accurate 
encoder[s] of information [that] suspend[] judgment until the 
end of the case.”165  Recognizing this, the Arizona Supreme 
Court Committee on the More Effective Use of Juries proposed 
that jurors “be instructed that they are permitted to discuss the 
evidence among themselves in the jury room during recesses 
from trial, when all are present, as long as they reserve 
judgment about the outcome of the case until deliberations 
commence.”166  It is a sensible reform with profound 
consequences. 
The benefits of such a reform in the patent litigation 
context are manifest.  Allowing jurors to discuss evidence 
during the course of the trial will enhance “juror understanding 
of the evidence”, and questions that might be forgotten by the 
time deliberations begin can be asked immediately.167  The 
primary criticisms of this proposal are not without merit, 
however.  There is a legitimate concern that allowing jurors to 
discuss the case during the trial without having heard all of the 
evidence “(1) would cause jurors to make premature 
determinations about a case; (2) would jeopardize the jury’s 
impartiality; [and] (3) would cause extra-legal factors to cloud 
decision-making.”168  Fortunately, the fears of the critics have 
not materialized in those jurisdictions that have begun to allow 
the practice.  Thus far, studies have shown “no overall effects of 
trial discussions” on the timing of when jurors begin to make 
 
 164. See Dann, supra note 22, at 1263. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Jurors: The Power of 12, supra note 134, at 98. 
 167. Dann, supra note 22, at 1264; see also Dees, supra note 102, at 1782 
(noting that not only can pre-deliberation discussion “lead to enhanced 
understanding of the case,” but it “can lead to more thoughtful consideration 
of the case; . . . reduce juror stress; and . . . result in greater efficiency”). 
 168. Dees, supra note 102, at 1782.  Anderson notes similar criticism but 
adds that another fear is that not only will jurors form opinions earlier on, but 
that subsequent to forming an opinion, jurors will “pay greater attention to 
evidence that confirms” their initial opinion.  Anderson supra note 146, at 95 
(citing Commonwealth v. Kerpan, 498 A.2d 829, 831 (Pa. 1985)).  In addition, 
“[t]he quality of deliberations may decline as jurors become more familiar with 
each other’s views.”  Id. at 95 (citing JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 139 (G. Thomas 
Munsterman et al. eds., 1997)). 
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up their minds.169  Indeed, rather than make jurors more alike 
in terms of how they believe the case should turn out, allowing 
pre-deliberation discussions had the tendency to “encourage[] 
more vigorous debate.”170  Additionally, the vast majority of 
judges who have “had actual experience with civil jury trials in 
which pre-deliberation discussions were permitted”, reported 
that the practice was a “positive development”171 and that pre-
deliberation discussions should be permitted in civil cases.172 
While countless other reform proposals exist that would 
have the potential to improve the ability of jurors to recall, 
analyze, and understand the information presented to them at 
trial, the three proposed—permitting juror note taking, 
allowing juror questioning of witnesses, and enabling jurors to 
discuss the evidence amongst themselves during the course of 
the trial—would do the most in the way of improving the ability 
of the jurors to perform their task. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  If it had been as easy to remove the jury from the customs as from 
the laws of England, it would have perished under the Tudors; and the 
civil jury did in reality at that period save the liberties of England. . . . 
[T]he civil jury[] serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the 
minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which attend 
it, is the soundest preparation for free institutions.  It imbues all 
classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion of 
right.  If these two elements be removed, the love of independence 
becomes a mere destructive passion. . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . I do not know whether the jury is useful to those who have 
lawsuits, but I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who judge 
them . . . .173 
 
 169. Hans, supra note 104, at 95-96.  Additionally, Hans reports that 
“[j]udicial agreement with the jury verdicts was similar in trials where juries 
had or had not been permitted to participate in trial discussions.”  Id. 
 170. Id. at 96.  Additionally, juries that could engage in discussions about 
the case during the trial “reported more conflict and more difficulty reaching” 
a unanimous verdict than those juries that could not engage in such 
discussions.  Id. 
 171. Anderson, supra note 146, at 112-13 (quoting Natasha K. Lakamp, 
Deliberating Juror Predeliberation Discussions: Should California Follow the 
Arizona Model?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 845, 871 (1998)). 
 172. Lakamp, supra note 171, at 871.  In the study cited, 92.1% of the 
judges who responded to the survey (43.3%) favored allowing predeliberation 
discussions.  Id. 
 173. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284-85 (Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc. 1994) (1835). 
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As an institution, the jury has weathered the storms of 
time and withstood the salvos which nearly all political 
institutions face.  The petit jury developed in the 12th and 13th 
Centuries as a method of discovering truth.174  Since that time 
the methodologies employed by the jury have undergone 
dramatic change, as have the purposes for which the jury is 
used.  Yet, in America the jury has been elevated to a status 
not reached anywhere else on the globe.  In the United States, 
the jury has two fundamental natures that any reforms must 
take into account—the judicial and the political.175  From the 
time of the Navigation and Stamp Acts, the jury has taken on a 
political significance in this nation that it has not achieved 
elsewhere.  That is why, even in the patent litigation context, it 
is so difficult to reform the system without maintaining the role 
of the jury.  The institution is an omnipresent characteristic of 
our system, and thus far, the solutions that have garnered the 
most attention have been designed to improve upon, rather 
than eliminate the civil jury. 
While blue ribbon panels and specialty courts have merits 
that have not gone unnoticed in this Note, it is this author’s 
belief that those reforms are inadequate.  While such reforms 
alone would no doubt improve the quality of the jury’s fact-
finding, problems would remain that undermine the ability of 
any jury to perform its job.176  The passive juror model must be 
relegated to the dustbin of history.  Not only does it ignore 
human nature, but it threatens to undermine the integrity of 
the judicial process.  The law is, after all, administered by 
human beings.  While those involved in the process may try 
their hardest, they can, and at times, do arrive at wrong 
conclusions.  The purpose of this Note is to examine how the 
active juror model can be used to reform the patent litigation 
system.  As Mark Twain noted, jurors are often criticized for 
their ignorance.  The question to ask, then, is whether it is the 
jurors themselves or the procedures governing them that cause 
those in academia and in practice to view the jury so 
negatively. 
 
 
 174. See infra section II.A. 
 175. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 173, at 280. 
 176. See infra section III.A. 
